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Special Operations Forces (SOF) 
already make major contributions to 
national defense. However, the Department 
of Defense should adjust SOF operations, 
organization, and national-level command 
and control to deal more effectively with 
terrorism and related forms of political 
violence. Almost 20 years after the Special 
Operations Command was created, it is 
clear that to make strategic contributions 
to defeating current and emerging threats, 
SOF direct and indirect action capabilities 
should be organized in separate commands. 
SOF’s so-called indirect action activi-
ties—typically performed by Special Forces, 
psychological operations, and civil affairs 
when they work by, with, and through the 
forces and people of host countries, such as the 
Philippines, Afghanistan, or Iraq—are critical 
for reshaping the sociopolitical environment 
in which terrorists and insurgents thrive. A 
separate command will ensure resources and 
priority missions for indirect action capabili-
ties that currently are underemphasized. The 
new command’s indirect capabilities should be 
augmented by improved abilities to understand 
and influence traditional social networks.
SOF direct action capabilities that sup-
port or bring force to bear directly against the 
enemy are proficient but require national-level 
decisionmaking reforms. Better command and 
control mechanisms, including the Defense 
Department and national-level horizontal 
integration teams with their own resources, 
are necessary if direct action capabilities are 
to reach their full potential. 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) are vital 
for combating terrorism and the proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction. SOF promi-
nence in these missions has only grown since 
September 11, 2001, when the Nation realized 
its unprecedented power did not shield it from 
devastating unconventional attacks. While SOF 
are consumed by their operations in the war 
on terror, national leaders need to acknowledge 
neither Washington nor U.S. Special Operations 
Command (USSOCOM) is organized for optimal 
use of SOF.
To substantiate this claim, it is necessary 
to distinguish the two major approaches by 
which SOF accomplishes tasks. One facilitates 
or actually brings force to bear directly against 
the enemy. Examples include destroying a key 
installation (direct action), reconnoitering the 
installation before the attack (special recon-
naissance), and deceiving the enemy so an 
attack could be carried out (a subset of infor-
mation operations). The other approach works 
indirectly by, with, and through other military 
forces or civilians to achieve U.S. objectives. 
Examples include providing training and 
advice to help other countries defeat insurgents 
(foreign internal defense) or to reconstitute 
institutions and infrastructure (civil affairs).
These two broad approaches may be 
mutually supportive, producing a greater effect 
together than separately. Also, not all core SOF 
tasks fall neatly within one approach. Uncon-
ventional warfare, an indirect approach, might 
include direct engagement of enemy forces 
by U.S. personnel. Psychological operations 
can achieve effects by working directly on the 
motivation of enemy forces or indirectly on the 
willingness of the population to support them. 
Nevertheless, the distinction between the direct 
and indirect approaches helps clarify how SOF 
should be used both now and in the future. 
This essay argues that current and emerging 
forms of political violence not only make the 
two SOF approaches more important than ever, 
but also require their use in organizations 
transformed to handle such threats better.
Political Violence
An enormous spectrum of activity is cov-
ered by political violence, from election brawls 
to interstate warfare. Between these extremes, 
and of particular importance to the United 
States, is violence conducted or sponsored by 
nonstate actors. Transnational terrorism is an 
example of such violence, as is insurgency. 
Neither the state as an entity nor war as an 
activity will disappear within our planning 
timelines, but two attributes of contemporary 
political violence are likely to get worse. One, 
the use of mass casualty weapons by small 
groups, is relatively new, and we are already 
adapting to it. The other, violence supported 
by traditional social and communication 
networks, is longstanding, but we have largely 
ignored it because it is foreign to our experi-
ence and ill suited to our modern way of war. 
SOF can make critical contributions for dealing 
with both.
Very Lethal Weapons
Although the proliferation of lethal tech-
nologies is not a new problem, it is compounded 
by small, very lethal organizations. In the past, 
political power came from having large numbers 
of supporters. Violent groups wishing to gain 
power needed to win supporters through persua-
sion and intimidation. They had an incentive 
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to limit the use of violence lest they alienate 
potential supporters and stiffen the resistance of 
opponents. If they used excessive violence, they 
were unlikely to win and risked creating a back-
lash that might destroy them. Thus, in the past, 
terrorist groups that wanted to grow into political 
movements limited the amount of violence they 
used. Some recent evidence suggests that this 
logic apparently characterizes even the al Qaeda 
jihadist movement.1
Nevertheless, the spread of increasingly 
lethal technologies complicates analysis of 
terrorist violence. While it is not true, as often 
supposed, that terrorists are free to choose a level 
of violence or lethality based on religious, ethnic, 
or idiosyncratic views, extraordinarily lethal 
technology is likely to lead (indeed, has already 
led) some terrorists to think that this technology 
is a shortcut to power, circumventing the need 
to build political support. Thus, given advances 
in technology and their diffusion, we are likely 
to see small groups that have no ambition to 
grow through traditional political means and, 
hence, no motivation for moderation. Instead, 
they will seek political power through the pos-
session of terrible weapons. We also occasionally 
will face groups that want such weapons because 
members see them as a way of ending the world 
as we know it. There really is no solution to the 
problem of small, very lethal organizations other 
than taking all possible measures to prevent the 
acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, and 
directly eliminating the group or its members 
before they employ any such weapons they have.
The SOF direct action approach is well 
suited to combating small lethal organiza-
tions, and it receives much attention as the 
Department of Defense (DOD) emphasizes 
hunting down the al Qaeda leadership. How-
ever, the way in which traditional social and 
communication networks may support ter-
rorism and violent political movements is an 
often-ignored dimension of political violence 
that also calls for SOF capabilities. Since we 
tend to pay little attention to this phenom-
enon, it requires some explanation.
Traditional Networks
The 9/11 plotters, like the jihadist move-
ment generally, used the Internet and jet travel. 
They also used the hawala2 money transfer 
system and a global network of mosques. They 
operated in the modern world of individualism, 
electronic media, centralized bureaucratic con-
trol, and cellular phones. They also operated 
in a traditional, nontechnical world of family 
and tribe and decentralized, socially based 
authority. The terrorists operate in two worlds; 
we operate in only one. Thus, they have more 
strategic depth than we do.
The security advantage the jihadists 
acquire from using traditional networks is 
most evident. Our information and intel-
ligence collection capabilities are optimized 
for the modern world only. Human intelli-
gence as a bureaucratic enterprise developed 
in Europe with the European state system. 
Technical intelligence developed later and 
reflects this system and its centralized bu-
reaucracies. Both human and technical 
intelligence have adapted to that world. We 
can intercept electronic messages and track 
money through the international banking 
system better than we can track money in 
the hawala system or understand what goes 
on in religious brotherhoods.
The socially based security advantage 
that terrorists enjoy (and our corresponding 
disadvantage) is perhaps the most glaring 
consequence of our inability to operate in the 
traditional social world, but two others are also 
important. First, because they are organizations 
at risk, terrorist groups tend to recruit from 
among those they trust, which typically means 
from among their existing social relation-
ships—family, kin, friends, mosque attendees.3 
The strength of traditional social networks 
is an important advantage in the recruiting 
process, which we have only a limited ability to 
understand and affect. Second, we tend to think 
that strategic communication and the war of 
ideas are important for winning the war on ter-
ror, but, as far as our adversaries are concerned, 
that part of the struggle takes place largely at 
the level of the individual imam or tribal elder. 
Our ability to understand or influence that 
level of traditional communication is limited.4 
In security, recruiting, and communicating, 
traditional social networks provide our enemies 
with significant advantages.
Influencing Networks
Not all political violence or even all ter-
rorism gets decisive support from the tradi-
tional social world, but the kind that threatens 
us most now and in the foreseeable future does. 
Organizing SOF to deal with transnational net-
works will demand a good deal of change. SOF 
already is organized to deal with small lethal 
groups, and doing so better requires relatively 
fewer adjustments.
The United States has confronted tradi-
tional networks consistently since the end of 
World War II. We face them now in Iraq, the 
Middle East, Central Asia, South and Southeast 
Asia, Northern Africa, in some places in Latin 
America—in those areas where the writ of the 
modern bureaucratic state does not run strong 
and U.S. personnel must often operate in aus-
tere and possibly violent circumstances.
Only two organizations in the U.S. Gov-
ernment have expertise in preparing people to 
operate in such circumstances and supporting 
them once they are there: DOD and the Central 
Intelligence Agency’s (CIA’s) Directorate of 
Operations (DO). Tasking the DO to penetrate 
and influence traditional social and communi-
cation networks would have serious drawbacks. 
First, its training, structure, and incentives all 
focus case officers on modern information and 
bureaucratic state-centric systems. Case officers 
want to know what key decisionmakers have 
decided. As collectors, they take this same ap-
proach to terrorist organizations; as operators, 
they want to disrupt these organizations. Case 
officers who operate in the midst of traditional 
networks hardly ignore them, but the director-
ate is not structured, nor its personnel trained, 
to make traditional networks a priority, nor 
should they be. The traditional DO approach 
is necessary and needs to be done better, which 
will consume its time and resources.
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The second reason the directorate should 
not have the responsibility for understanding 
and influencing traditional social networks is 
that association with the DO risks compromising 
and limiting the influence of the indigenous 
people with whom it works. A clandestine ap-
proach should be taken only when necessary. 
The relationships of trust that characterize tra-
ditional social systems can be developed overtly. 
Clandestine tradecraft, the directorate’s core 
competence, is not necessary for understanding 
and influencing traditional social networks and 
would actually be counterproductive.
Since a new organization devoted to 
traditional networks is neither necessary nor 
likely, eliminating the DO as an option leaves 
the Department of Defense as the choice to 
understand and influence the traditional social 
world. There are organizations in DOD that 
already do this work. When Special Forces (SF)5 
engage in the indirect approach, when they 
work by, with, and through indigenous forces 
or personnel, they are often working within tra-
ditional social and communication networks. 
So, too, are civil affairs and psychological 
operations (PSYOP) forces. Some PSYOP teams 
in Iraq gathered and disseminated information 
working through and with traditional social 
networks, although this is not a doctrinal task 
for PSYOP. The work these forces do in this 
regard needs to be improved and augmented.
Building New Capability
Improving SF capabilities to operate in 
the traditional social world will come largely 
from focusing their energies on that world. 
SF teams currently prepare for an array of 
missions. If they devote their finite time and 
resources to the indirect approach, which 
must include maintaining their small unit 
military skills, they will get better at it. They 
will be able to focus selection and train-
ing on this mission, for example. They will 
learn more about it, and doctrine will begin 
to change and improve, as will the tactics, 
techniques, and procedures of engaging with 
the traditional social world. Deeper knowledge 
of traditional networks will make SF not only 
more capable for independent SOF missions 
but also better able to support conventional 
force operations.
Beyond reorientation of SF, a separate 
cadre of specialists on traditional networks 
is needed. Ideally, the kinds of professionals 
best suited for this mission would transfer 
into their new career track in their late 20s 
or early 30s with prior exposure to foreign 
cultures and languages. Upon completion 
of additional specialized military and other 
training requirements, their initial assign-
ment could be an overseas tour working in a 
U.S. Embassy, either for a defense attaché or 
on loan to the political, economic, or develop-
ment assistance sections of a given country 
team. As with all other accredited U.S. dip-
lomatic personnel, their specific (and overt) 
purpose would be to interact with the people 
and institutions of the host nation in order to 
conduct bilateral assistance programs within 
their scope of duties; a greater understanding 
of traditional social networks would be an in-
evitable consequence of that kind of contact. 
How and with whom trust and knowledge are 
built would depend on the interplay of local 
circumstances and the skills and background 
of each individual. A second tour would follow 
in a nearby country, and then a third, perhaps 
in the country of the first tour, with time for 
training and education. Long periods spent 
in a subregion (for example, western sub-Sa-
haran Africa) and in one or two countries in 
that subregion are necessary to build relation-
ships, knowledge, and influence.
With their expertise in traditional social 
and communication systems, these personnel 
should be key advisors if American forces need 
to deploy to their country or region. They 
would help prepare SF for their training mis-
sions and other deployments, alerting them 
to key figures in traditional networks. These 
specialists could assist the Embassy public 
affairs officers in shaping their messages. In 
operational settings, they would assist PSYOP 
personnel in the same fashion. They would 
serve as eyes and ears in places that U.S. and 
even local officials seldom visit, which, for 
that reason, are places where things of inter-
est to the United States happen. They would 
be able to assist State Department and other 
personnel in identifying individuals of inter-
est to the United States. Information they 
gathered from the Lebanese community in 
West Africa, for example, might be of interest 
to U.S. personnel in the Middle East, France, 
and the tri-border region of Latin America, 
as well as to analysts and policymakers in 
Washington. Their information would also be 
useful to a range of Federal law enforcement 
and intelligence agencies.
In addition to assisting military forces 
and U.S. Government agencies, this new cadre 
would wield its own influence, which would 
come from the relationships of trust it develops 
and from its assistance to extant overt U.S. 
Government programs. Ultimately, this cadre 
should have its own funding to provide overt 
assistance to key leaders and organizations in 
the traditional social world. This would need 
to be done carefully, but in some cases might 
consist of nothing more than a gift of food to 
a village. The point in such gifts would not be 
their munificence but rather the relationship 
within which they occurred.
This brief outline raises a host of ques-
tions about the personnel management of 
these specialists.6 For example, they do not 
need a highly differentiated rank structure. 
Those who enter this work will not have 
command of progressively larger numbers 
of personnel. Hence, their status should cor-
respond more to something like apprentice, 
journeyman, and master than to the tradi-
tional military hierarchy. However these and 
other such issues are decided (and how they 
are decided will be critical to the success of 
these specialists), the personnel system will 
be different from anything now found in the 
Defense Department. Since the organization 
will be small, certainly by Defense standards, 
it must be part of some other separate orga-
nization within the department, or it will be 
overwhelmed by the DOD bureaucracy. Given 
its function, this new organization should be 
grouped with the other Defense components 
that focus on the indirect approach so that it 
can complement them.
Command Restructure
Once the utility of grouping SF, civil af-
fairs, PSYOP, and the new cadre of traditional 
social and communication network specialists 
is seen, further consideration suggests that 
they constitute a separate organization within 
the department. A review of SOF history and 
current activities shows that DOD and, more 
recently, USSOCOM have typically given lower 
priority to the indirect approach and those who 
carry it out.
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Just as SOF did not flourish until separated 
from the conventional military under its own 
command, the indirect approach of SOF will not 
flourish unless it is separated from SOF direct  
action components. Thus, we suggest establish-
ing a separate joint command in DOD—per-
haps called the Unconventional Warfare Com-
mand—that would include SF, civil affairs, 
PSYOP, and the new cadre described above. The 
command would draw upon all services for 
personnel and would in other respects func-
tion much as USSOCOM functions now, paying 
for training and equipment specifically related 
to unconventional warfare but relying on the 
services for all other support. The command 
thus would have a Major Force Program in the 
DOD budget and have acquisition authority. For 
example, it would take responsibility for modify-
ing aircraft for PSYOP use. Access to transporta-
tion resources for members of the new command 
might require that it control some aircraft, 
although it may be able to rely on Air Force or 
Army assets for transport. It would also need 
authority to devise new personnel management 
procedures, since the current DOD procedures 
should not apply to the new cadre. Person-
nel reforms would have to extend into all the 
Services, however, since these personnel would 
have a different career progression. Over time, it 
might be that the personnel system of the new 
cadre would better fit at least some civil affairs 
and PSYOP personnel as well.
A four-star officer should lead this new 
command. It will run into a host of bureau-
cratic problems and will need an officer at 
that level, plus considerable assistance from 
high-ranking DOD civilians, to establish itself. 
The primary problem in DOD for the new 
command will be the general disregard for 
the indirect approach. The State Department 
is likely to ignore the new command and its 
knowledge of traditional networks. The CIA 
is likely to claim first that it already does 
this work; next, that the work is not neces-
sary; and finally, that it is cooperating fully, 
while it uses its chief of station authority to 
restrict where the new command sends its 
personnel and what they do. The command 
will also have to sort out relations between its 
components and the Intelligence Community 
beyond CIA. For example, SF already collect 
information (and could learn to collect and 
report it better) that should interest the Intel-
ligence Community. Even if relations with 
other agencies remain problematic temporar-
ily, the new command will give the indirect 
approach better standing within DOD and 
will improve its ability to support the direct 
approach of SOF and conventional forces and 
to carry on such independent indirect mis-
sions as foreign internal defense. Altogether, 
the various activities of the command will 
give DOD and the U.S. Government the global 
scouts that SF are sometimes characterized 
to be.
A critic might note the expense implicit in 
these proposals and wonder if they are neces-
sary. After all, DOD and SOF have already taken 
some steps to address the cultural and social 
aspects of warfare. Although these measures 
will help, the underlying phenomenon of 
terrorism and insurgency is not cultural but 
social. Unless we focus on the traditional social 
world, we will not get better at understanding 
and influencing it and at mastering and using 
to our advantage the indirect approach to our 
enemies. Failing to do this, we will not deal 
effectively with the major problem before us.
Lethal Organizations
Establishing a separate command focused 
on the indirect approach is critical for dealing 
with traditional networks. It will also have an 
unintended benefit. SOF not in this new orga-
nization—the special mission units, the Navy 
Sea-Air-Land teams, the Army Rangers, the 
160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, 
and Air Force Combat Controllers and Parares-
cue personnel—will form a new organization 
(perhaps called the Special Operations Strike 
Command)7 that would retain USSOCOM’s cur-
rent Service-like responsibilities and authorities 
but would focus on direct action missions. This 
organizational change would allow the Strike 
Command to focus on small, very lethal orga-
nizations. Such organizations will operate as 
terrorist groups, as radical religious sects that 
develop into violent organizations, or as the 
forces of countries that develop limited num-
bers of advanced weapons that they seek to use 
clandestinely for maximum effect. In all these 
cases, the U.S. Government may be compelled 
to act against organizations when they have 
such weapons or to prevent their acquisition. 
To do so, the best strike and raid capability pos-
sible will be needed. A confrontation with one 
of these organizations is likely to reveal that 
they possess technology as advanced as ours in 
enough categories to make them formidable 
enemies. Extremist sects, for example, have 
long had a tendency to retreat into compounds, 
but in the future, commercially available tech-
nology will be sufficiently developed to allow 
these nonstate groups to build not just com-
pounds but daunting fortresses. While many 
such groups will pose no threat to the United 
States, some may threaten Americans abroad, 
while others will see the United States as the 
keystone of the order they must destroy for a 
new one to emerge and, hence, as their enemy.
Integration Problem
The new Special Operations Strike Com-
mand will not, in and of itself, give the United 
States a more robust direct action capability. 
It will only improve this capability if it is used 
correctly. The U.S. Government is not currently 
well organized to do this. These organizational 
defects are two-fold: lack of integration across 
bodies of functional expertise and familiar-
ity with SOF capabilities. Lack of integration 
undermines complex endeavors such as coun-
terterrorism or counterproliferation. SOF direct 
action capabilities are critical in these activities 
but should not be used without regard for a 
host of political, diplomatic, and legal issues. 
The lack of regular communication between 
civilian and even military decisionmakers and 
SOF direct action forces also produces failures 
and suboptimal performance.
The integration problem results from 
a security bureaucracy organized around 
dominant organizations dedicated to expertise 
in a single functional area. Yet many cur-
rent security problems are so complex and 
fast-evolving that they require the integrated 
expertise of many Government agencies and 
even nongovernmental organizations. To 
achieve this integration, we need new “hori-
zontal integration” teams to draw upon but 
cut across functional areas to produce sound, 
integrated, adaptive solutions.
Integration Solution
To build these teams, the Secretary of 
Defense would authorize an individual with 
relevant experience and leadership skills 
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to bring together subject matter experts 
now divided among various organizations 
within DOD. The team would develop strate-
gies and plans for specific problems, such 
as terrorism, and oversee implementation 
of these plans, as well as budgetary and 
acquisition issues. The team would not be a 
task force but a structure as permanent as 
the problem it was designated to deal with. 
Comprehending the problem and solution in 
an end-to-end fashion, the team would use 
its authority to intervene selectively to en-
sure progress—mostly at the strategic level, 
where the efforts of functional organizations 
tend to compete and work at cross-purposes, 
but down to whatever level of detail was 
required to ensure successful outcomes.
Making the transition to new horizontal 
organizations will be difficult. In particular, 
achieving unity of effort requires, at one level, 
violating the principle of unity of command. 
The experts who populate the teams report 
to two leaders, one in the organization they 
come from and the other the integration team 
leader, who can reward or release them, if 
they are not loyal and dedicated to producing 
the best overall solution. This “dual author-
ity” problem is the single point of failure 
for such horizontal integration teams. If the 
Secretary of Defense does not impress upon 
his immediate subordinates the importance 
of collaboration and information-sharing, 
they may instruct the experts they send to the 
teams to protect organizational interests at 
all costs. In such cases, the teams may pro-
duce “least common denominator” products 
that satisfy individual team members but are 
inconsistent and ineffective.
However, if DOD can make the transition 
to empowered, collaborative teams, it will help 
tackle some of the most intractable problems 
that it faces. The effect would be even greater if 
such teams took hold across the Government 
to deal with key national security issues. Again, 
these would not be the customary interagency 
deliberating bodies, or even the interagency 
Executive Committees that the Clinton ad-
ministration used, but small permanent 
organizations with authority, derived from the 
President, over both their agendas and their 
own resources, devoted to developing policies 
and strategies and reporting directly to the 
Principals Committee (the national security 
Cabinet-level authorities).
SOF Familiarity Problem
Solving the integration and coordina-
tion problem within DOD and among other 
national security agencies would leave another 
problem specific to SOF direct action capabil-
ity. The command and control relationship 
between direct action units and senior civilian 
and military decisionmakers is too distant. Se-
nior leaders must understand SOF tactical ca-
pabilities and limitations to employ SOF most 
effectively and discreetly. This understanding 
and discretion can only be developed through 
direct contact with SOF operational leaders and 
familiarity with their modes of operation. With 
such familiarity, senior leaders are more likely 
to examine and guide strategic operations criti-
cally from conception through completion.
SOF operations in Somalia in 1993 are 
a perfect illustration of both the integration 
and vertical command and control problems 
inherent in strategic direct action. SOF Task 
Force Ranger was sent to Mogadishu in sum-
mer 1993 to capture Mohammed Farah Aideed, 
a faction leader whom the U.S. Government 
judged to be the key troublemaker in Somalia. 
Washington wanted Aideed captured in order to 
establish the peacemaking capabilities of the 
United Nations, which had taken over the effort 
to stabilize Somalia from the United States. 
This was a major policy initiative of the Clin-
ton administration. The mission was high-risk, 
since it required U.S. forces to conduct raids 
on short notice into hostile territory, with high 
political stakes for the administration. 
In this setting, SOF commanders in the 
field and at USSOCOM needed to be aware of 
how the Nation’s political-military strategy was 
evolving. They needed to keep authorities in-
formed of developments in the field and evolv-
ing risks inherent in the course of action they 
were pursuing. They did not do so, nor do they 
appear to have been inclined to do so. But even 
if they had been, there was no single Washing-
ton-based authority they could have reported 
to that would have been able to provide defini-
tive guidance and to change course quickly in 
light of developments in the field. As the Senate 
report on the Somalia expedition concluded, 
U.S. policies were poorly coordinated, and 
civilian officials and military leaders were not 
carefully and continually reevaluating the SOF 
mission to determine if the risks were too high.8 
This failure to coordinate policy and operations 
contributed significantly to the failure of the 
SOF mission in Somalia and to a strategic and 
political failure for the United States.
The argument might be made that a new 
and naïve administration was responsible for 
the confusion in Washington when Task Force 
Ranger was deployed to Somalia. However, such 
setbacks have characterized the administrations 
of Presidents both new and seasoned. The fault 
lies not only in poor leadership but also in poor 
organization. An integrated team operating in 
DOD—or preferably across the relevant na-
tional security departments and agencies—as 
the single authority for policy and operations 
could have eliminated or at least diminished 
the command and control problems that ulti-
mately contributed to failure in Somalia.
SOF Familiarity Solution
Effective command and control of SOF 
direct action missions will not come automati-
cally from linking direct action capabilities to 
the integrated teams proposed here or to the 
President following their advice. The charac-
teristics of both decisionmakers and operators 
tend to undermine effective command and 
control. For example, as the Senate report on 
Task Force Ranger noted:
One of the weaknesses of a unit like Task 
Force Ranger, whose combat capabilities 
are unparalleled, is the belief by the unit 
members and its commanders that they 
can accomplish any mission. Because of the 
supreme confidence of special operations 
forces, the chain of command must provide 
more oversight to this type of unit than to 
conventional forces.9
However, civilian decisionmakers often lack 
sufficient understanding of direct action opera-
tions to oversee them effectively. Senior military 
commanders may also lack such understanding 
and often have prejudices against SOF.10 The 
result is that DOD integrated teams made up of 
such civilian and military leaders alone will not 
be able to provide the oversight that SOF need.
If special operations are to achieve  
policymaker objectives, and if the risk of a 
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Hawala is an alternative or parallel remittance system. It exists 
and operates outside of, or parallel to ‘traditional’ banking 
or financial channels. . . . The components of hawala that 
distinguish it from other remittance systems are trust and the 
extensive use of connections such as family relationships or 
regional affiliations. . . . hawala makes minimal (often no) 
use of any sort of negotiable instrument. Transfers of money 
take place based on communications between members of a 
network of hawaladars, or hawala dealers.
For additional background on traditional forms of banking 
and its abuse by criminal and transnational terrorist groups, see 
Kimberley L. Thachuk, Terrorism’s Financial Lifeline: Can It Be 
Severed? Strategic Forum 191 (Washington, DC: National Defense 
University Press, May 2002).
3 On this point, consider Doug McAdam, “Recruitment to 
High Risk Activism: The Case of Freedom Summer,” The American 
Journal of Sociology 92 (July 1986), 64–90.
4 This limitation is widely recognized and a long-stand-
ing problem for transregional powers. See C.A. Bayly, Empire and 
Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication 
in India, 1780–1870 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), for a useful case study of some of the issues in this paragraph.
5 The term Special Operations Forces refers broadly 
to forces from all the Services that conduct special operations, 
whereas the term Special Forces—also know as Green Berets— 
refers more specifically to the U.S. Army forces that specialize in 
unconventional warfare.
6 Further details on a possible personnel system are available 
in Anna Simons and David Tucker, “Improving Human Intelligence 
in the War on Terrorism: The Need for an Ethnographic Capability,” 
submitted to the Office of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, December 2004.
7 This name and the mission of the command would 
return U.S. Special Operations Command to something like the 
original vision of Edward C. Meyer, a key early supporter of an 
improved direct action capability. See J.W. Partin, interview with 
General Edward C. Meyer, USA, Arlington, Virginia, July 14, 1988 
(typescript in author’s possession).
8 Senators John Warner (R–VA) and Carl Levin (D–MI), 
“Review of the Circumstances Surrounding the Ranger Raid on 
October 3–4, 1993 in Mogadishu, Somalia,” September 29, 1995, 50.
9 Ibid., 49–50.
10 For an example of a civilian decisionmaker failing to 
understand the complexities and risks of a direct action mis-
sion, see Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred 
Terror (New York: Random House, 2002), 318. One might also 
consider Richard Shultz, “Showstoppers,” The Weekly Standard 
( January 26, 2004), 25–33. Shultz reports that senior military 
leaders did not trust SOF but fails himself to give due weight to 
the risks entailed by the direct action missions he touts.
11 The full text of the October 16, 2004, memorandum is 
available at <www.usatoday.com/news/washington/executive/
rumsfeldmemo.htm>.
military operation is to be commensurate with 
the importance of the policy objective it is  
intended to serve, then the goals and restraints 
of policy must inform operational planning, 
just as the possibilities and problems of opera-
tions must inform policymaking. Somehow, 
senior policymakers and operators must learn 
to collaborate effectively when SOF direct  
action is used in pursuit of strategic objectives. 
To that end, the proposed Special Opera-
tions Strike Command should work closely with 
the DOD and interagency horizontal integration 
teams in Washington. These teams, and Cabinet 
officials as well, should participate with operators 
in frequent, realistic simulations of the approval, 
conduct, and possible consequences of direct 
action missions. The policymakers must include 
the Secretaries of State and Defense, the National 
Security Adviser, and, above all, the President. 
Such officials will be in command of the most 
delicate and risky missions that SOF will be 
called upon to perform.
Such exercises would give the civilian 
decisionmakers an opportunity to ask questions 
about the planning and thinking of SOF in set-
tings that should reproduce the operational and 
political risk involved in potential missions. This 
interaction also would educate military lead-
ers about the civilians for whom they work and 
the political realities that must govern military 
operations. To be effective, these exercises need to 
be done with the officers directly responsible for 
conducting direct action missions.
Exercises of this sort do take place, but 
too often senior leaders do not participate. They 
should. The exercises also need to occur often 
enough to erode the usual veneer of formality 
and politeness between decisionmakers and 
operators, allowing realistic exchanges to occur. 
These exercises would not replace the briefings 
that Presidents and senior advisers receive about 
particularly risky operations as part of the nor-
mal approval process. Instead, the scenarios pro-
posed here are intended to educate all involved 
so that decisionmaking in such operations will 
be better informed.
Objections will arise to this proposal for 
realistic exercises, the most sensitive of which 
is the charge that they will increase civilian 
meddling in operations. In fact, approval of 
operations and delegation of authority might be 
more forthcoming, more appropriately given, 
and more strictly adhered to, if military and 
civilian decisionmakers understand, and hence 
have more trust in, each other. For good reason, 
the military insists that it must train as it plans 
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to fight. When it comes to direct action missions, 
this training must include decisionmakers.
The Reform Challenge
For the foreseeable future, SOF as practi-
tioners of both direct and indirect approaches 
need to be employed to the fullest extent pos-
sible. The forces will take care of the challenges 
of training, tactics, techniques, and procedures 
if they are resourced and allowed to do so. 
But allowing them to do their best ultimately 
requires major reforms in organization, com-
mand and control, and policy oversight:
■ separate commands for SOF direct and indirect 
actions capabilities to include a cadre of specialists on 
traditional social and communication networks
■ DOD and interagency teams with the au-
thority and resources to tackle the most important 
security problems the Nation faces
■ frequent exercises with national decisionmak-
ers and the commanders of the special mission units.
Two years ago, Secretary of Defense Don-
ald Rumsfeld queried his top officials11 as to 
whether the billions of dollars being spent to 
defeat terrorists were having sufficient effect, 
and whether a new organization was needed. 
He expressed particular concern about whether 
the enemy was recruiting more to its ranks 
than we were capturing, dissuading, or killing. 
The Secretary’s concerns were well placed, and 
his willingness to consider new organizations 
and command and control relationships is 
laudable. Such change is difficult and costly 
but, in the case of SOF and the most challeng-
ing forms of political violence that threaten us, 
also necessary.
Notes
1 Douglas Jehl and Thom Shanker, “Al Qaeda Tells Ally 
in Iraq to Strive for Global Goals,” The New York Times, October 
7, 2005. Terrorism experts have differed over al Qaeda strategy for 
some time, and they debate the authenticity and meaning of the 
captured al Qaeda document reported in this article as well.
2 Interpol Web site, accessed at <www.interpol.int/Public/
FinancialCrime/MoneyLaundering/hawala/default.asp#2>:
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